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BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY, LTD. V. COREL CORPORATION REVISITED:  
AUTHORS GUILD V. HATHITRUST AND THE NEW FRONTIER OF FAIR USE 
 
 





On June 10, 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in 
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust,1 that a research university compiling mass digital copies of 
copyrighted works to create a library database was fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107.2 This 
unprecedented decision by the Second Circuit set the stage for how educational mass digitization 
would be treated in the future.  
Prior to this decision, courts had not addressed the issue of whether works as products of 
a digitization process were copyrightable since Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel 
Corporation.3 Bridgeman Art Library, now Bridgeman Images, was founded in 1972 with the 
purpose of providing a “central resource of fine art . . . for reproduction to creative 
professionals.”4 Bridgeman is in the business of contracting with art museums and other 
organizations to obtain color transparencies or digital photographs of public domain artwork 
from their collections that would be marketed publicly. Copies of these digital photographs are 
provided to those who license with Bridgeman to use the images, as well as to their clients on 
                                                 
1 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 105 (2d Cir. 2014). 
2 Id. 
3 Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
4 About Bridgeman, BRIDGEMAN IMAGES, http://www.bridgemanimages.com/en-US/about-bridgeman/ 
(last visited Aug. 4, 2015). 
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CD-ROMs.5 Corel marketed computer software products – one of which was a set of seven CD-
ROMs containing seven hundred (700) digital reproductions of well-known public domain 
artwork.6 Bridgeman contended that the digital images in Corel’s possession could have only 
come from Bridgeman and therefore infringed their copyright in those images.7 Two different 
cases were filed in the Southern District of New York. The first Bridgeman decision, in 
November 1998, decided that the United Kingdom’s law determined whether Bridgeman’s 
works were even copyrightable, finding that they did not because they lacked sufficient 
originality8, while United States law was used to decide whether infringement had occurred, 
which the court also posited it did not because no actual copying had been proved.9 Following 
the first decision, the court agreed to rehear the case after Bridgeman moved for reargument and 
reconsideration.10 In the second Bridgeman decision, United States law was applied to both 
issues of copyrightability and infringement, however, the result was the same. The court 
ultimately reasoned that copyright in the works was unavailable, because Bridgeman, by their 
own testament, created “slavish copies” that had “no spark of originality.”11  
Since Bridgeman was decided in 1999, numerous scholars have argued that the case was 
wrongly decided. Some arguments are grounded in the understanding that not allowing copyright 
in the photographic reproductions of artworks by museums and institutions like Bridgeman, 
actually goes against copyright law’s ultimate mission of encouraging public viewing and 
                                                 
5 Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, 423-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
6 Id. at 424-25. 
7 Id. at 425-26. 
8 Id. at 427. 
9 Id. at 428. 
10 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
11 Id. at 197. 
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consumption of artwork.12 Others stand for the proposition that the decision denies the amateur 
and professional museum photographer incentives to ply their craft by denying protection in a 
way that is fundamentally unfair.13 Regardless, the academic community has analyzed and in 
many cases criticized the holding of Bridgeman and its long-term effects on copyright law.  
These arguments have been centered on the debate of whether or not the Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., originality requirement of a 
“minimal degree of creativity” was actually satisfied.14 I come to the same conclusion as many of 
these scholars – the decision of Bridgeman is wrong – wrong for its impact on the future of 
copyright law and wrong for its negative effect on society’s access and consumption of artwork. 
However, I come to this conclusion not on an originality argument, but rather for an argument of 
fair use. As it stands, under Bridgeman, museums have little incentive outside of advertisements 
for exhibitions and merchandise sales in the gift shop to produce photographic reproductions of 
their art work still under copyright. An application of fair use would encourage museums to 
create photographic reproductions of their artwork, furthering the dissemination of such works to 
society for educational and cultural consumption – a current that runs at the heart of copyright 
law. Because of the recent decisions by the Second Circuit in HathiTrust, understandings of fair 
use have expanded to adapt to a technologically dependent society and, as a result, seriously call 
into question the rationale behind Bridgeman today. 
 
  
                                                 
12 Robin J. Allan, After Bridgeman: Copyright, Museums, and Public Domain Works of Art, 155 U. PA. L. 
REV. 961, 964 (2007). 
13 Terry S. Kogan, Photographic Reproductions, Copyright and the Slavish Copy, 35 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 445, 448 (2012). 
14 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 49 U.S. 340 (1991).  See generally 
Kimberly N. Dobson, The Originality of Photographs for Purposes of Copyright Law Before and After 
Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 10 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 319, 320-21 (2009). 
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In December, 2004, Google announced its Library Project to respond to the demands of 
the digital world for not only a workable but comprehensive location to access digital copies of 
published works. Other companies and organizations15 have attempted to interject themselves 
into this forum, but pale in comparison to Google’s ambitious goal to create a “comprehensive, 
searchable, virtual card catalog of all books in all languages.”16  
Essentially, Google digitizes a library’s print work and retains one copy to be made 
available on Google Books, where users can search the content and view “snippets” of the pages 
of the books.17 In exchange for providing books to Google’s repository, Google then gives the 
participating libraries with the other digital copy of the book.18 Universities that participated in 
partnerships with Google saw their newfound collection of digitized materials as an opportunity 
to create a shared digital repository for these Universities in order to provide access to each 
other’s digital collections, and in October, 2008, became the HathiTrust Digital Library (HDL).19 
In other words, after Google supplies the participating Universities with the digital copy of the 
printed work, it is then made part of the HDL.20  
 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., PROJECT GUTENBERG, http://www.gutenberg.org/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2015); INTERNET 
ARCHIVE, https://archive.org/index.php (last visited Aug. 4, 2015). 
16 Google Books Library Project, GOOGLE BOOKS, https://www.google.com/googlebooks/library/ (last 
visited Aug. 4, 2015). 
17 Authors Guild v. Hathitrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
18 More than two copies are made of the books in actuality. However, only two copies are made available 
to the public eye. See Emily Anne Proskine, Google’s Technicolor Dreamcoat: A Copyright Analysis of 
the Google Book Search Library Project, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 213, 217 (2006). 
19 Jeremy York, This Library Never Forgets: Preservation, Cooperation, and the Making of HathiTrust 
Digital Library, in SOC’Y FOR IMAGING SCI. & TECH., ARCHIVING 2008 FINAL PROGRAM AND 
PROCEEDINGS 5 (2008), available at http://www.hathitrust.org/documents/This-Library-Never-
Forgets.pdf. 
20 Id. 
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B. Procedural History 
 
Twenty authors and authors’ associations brought a copyright infringement action against 
HathiTrust on September 12, 2011, in the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York. The plaintiffs, led by the Authors Guild, sought an injunction against the 
“reproduction, distribution, or display” of any of their member authors’ works, an injunction 
against the Universities’ original supplication of print works to Google for the purposes of 
digitization unless authorized, and the impoundment of all unauthorized digital copies already in 
HathiTrust’s possession.21 
HathiTrust moved for summary judgment on the ground that their use of the copyright 
material was protected under the doctrine of fair use.22 Judge Harold Baer, Jr. granted 
HathiTrust’s motions for summary judgment on the infringement claim and stated that: 
Although I recognize that the facts here may on some levels be without precedent, 
I am convinced that they fall safely within the protection of fair use such that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact. I cannot imagine a definition of fair use 
that would not encompass the transformative uses made by [HDL] and would 
require that I terminate this invaluable contribution to the progress of science and 
cultivation of the arts that at the same time effectuates the ideals espoused by the 
[Americans with Disabilities Act].23 
 
The district court summarized that the digitized works that become a part of the HDL are used in 
three ways: 1) full-text searches, 2) preservation for the future, and 3) print-disability access.24 In 
regards to the full-text searches, the district court noted that “[f]or works that are not in the 
public domain or for which the copyright owner has not authorized use, the full-text search 
indicates only the page numbers on which a particular term is found and the number of times the 
                                                 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 456. 
23 Id. at 464. 
24 Authors Guild v. Hathitrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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term appears on each page.”25 Further, the district court reasoned that HDL had “revolutionized” 
academic participation for print-disabled students.26 
Authors Guild then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s findings that HathiTrust’s digitization of 
copyrighted works to permit full-text searches and print-disability access was fair use.27 
C. Fair Use 
 
The Copyright Act, while granting exclusive rights to authors of works during their term of 
copyright, also limits that control through the doctrine of fair use. To determine whether each of 
a use is protected under the doctrine of fair use, courts look to 17 U.S.C. § 107 for the four non-
exclusive factors to be weighed to assess whether a “particular use is fair”:  
[1] the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
[2] the nature of the copyrighted work; 
[3] the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and 
[4] the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.28 
  
Rather confusingly, court opinions have lacked specificity on how fair use works: as an 
affirmative defense to a prima facie showing of infringement29, or a protected use which is not 
considered infringement at all.30 Regardless, courts can agree that the factors must be evaluated 
to ultimately determine whether the goal of copyright, “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
                                                 
25 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
26 Id. at 449. 
27 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 97-103 (2d Cir. 2014). The issue of preservation for 
future use was remanded back to the district court to determine whether there were any plaintiffs who had 
standing to bring suit. Id. at 104. 
28 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
29 Authors Guild, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 448. 
30 Authors Guild, 755 F.3d at 95. 
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useful Arts,”31 is best served by allowing the use rather than prohibiting it.32 Further, when 
evaluating all four factors, courts also consider an important theme that flows through each 
factor: a fair use will not be considered fair, if it “excessively damage[s] the market for the 
original by providing the public with a substitute for that original work.”33 
1. Character and Purpose of the Use 
The first factor evaluates the character and purpose of the use, with especial focus on 
whether the use is transformative.34 A use is transformative if it “adds something new, with a 
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or 
message . . . .”35 
Rejecting Authors Guild’s argument that the use is not transformative because HDL has 
not added anything “new,”36 the district court stated that “a transformative use can also be one 
that serves an entirely different purpose.”37 The district court articulated that HDL serves an 
entirely different purpose than that of the original print works.38 Further, the district court, based 
on Second Circuit case law,39 stated that this factor can weigh in a defendants’ favor when the 
purpose of the use is for scholarship and research.40 Despite Authors Guild’s argument that HDL 
should not be “shielded . . . by virtue of their status as educational non-profits” and that HDL had 
a primarily commercial purpose when it made its agreement with Google,41 the district court 
                                                 
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
32 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994). 
33 Authors Guild, 755 F.3d at 95.  
34 Id. at 96. 
35 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569. 
36 Authors Guild v. Hathitrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 See NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2004). 
40 Authors Guild, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 459. 
41 Id. at 461. 
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concluded that HDL satisfies the first factor not because of their non-profit status, but rather 
because the use is so transformative.42 Further, the district court added that the use of HDL to 
provide access for print-disabled patrons as especially transformative: “Print-disabled individuals 
are not considered to be a significant market or potential market to publishers and authors. As a 
result, the provision of access for them was not the intended use of the original work (enjoyment 
and use by sighted persons) and this use is transformative.”43  
On this factor, the Second Circuit disagreed with the district court’s finding that a use can 
be transformative by “[a]dded value or utility,” but rather that the “more transformative the new 
work, the less will be the significance of other factors . . . that may weigh against a finding of fair 
use.”44 In regards to the full-text searching, the Second Circuit concluded that it is a 
“quintessentially transformative use.”45 Because  no evidence can be found that authors write 
with the purpose of enabling full-text searching, no original purpose is superseded by the 
secondary creation, rather “HDL adds to the original something new with a different purpose and 
a different character.”46 
However, the Second Circuit disagreed with the district court’s finding that print-disabled 
access is a transformative use.47 They still ultimately conclude that the use is fair, but based on 
three other rationales. First, the Supreme Court in Sony Corporation of America v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc. stated that making available copies of a copyrighted work for print-disabled 
                                                 
42 Id. 
43 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
44 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
45 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 2014). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 101-02. 
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individuals is an “expressly identified . . . example of fair use.”48 Second, the House Committee 
Report that accompanied the Copyright Act of 1976 also stated an intention that making copies 
of works for the purposes of print-disabled accessibility was a “special instance illustrating the 
application of the fair use doctrine . . . .”49 Finally, the passage of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act demonstrates a Congressional commitment to providing better accommodations for the 
print-disabled.50 
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Works 
The second factor looks to the nature of the copyrighted work and considers whether it is 
close to the “core of intended copyright protection.”51 However, the second factor has limited 
utility in the fair use analysis when there is a finding in the first instance that the character and 
purpose is transformative.52 Indeed, “the nature of the copyrighted works is not likely to 
‘separate the fair use sheep from the infringing goats.’”53 
The district court rather briefly dismissed the second father as “not dispositive,” because 
they already found the full-text searching and access for print-disabled patrons as 
transformative.54 Similarly, the Second Circuit agreed that the works contained in the HDL are 
works that copyright laws seek to protect and thus weighs against fair use, but the transformative 
purpose of the use makes this factor’s weight minimal.55 
 
                                                 
48 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984), superseded by 
statute, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 1201). 
49 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 73 (1976). 
50 Authors Guild, 755 F.3d at 102. 
51 Authors Guild, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 461. 
52 Id. at 461-62. 
53 Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994)). 
54 Id. at 461. 
55 Authors Guild, 755 F.3d at 98, 102. 
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3. Amount and Substantiality of the Work Copied  
The third factor “asks whether the secondary use employs more of the copyrighted work 
than is necessary, and whether the copying was excessive in relation to any valid purposes 
asserted under the first factor.”56 Again, the findings as to the first factor impact the finding of 
the third, because the amount of allowable copying depends on the purpose and character of the 
use.57 
Here, the district court easily found that even though to operate HDL had to make entire 
copies of the print works, such copies were necessary to accomplish the purpose of full-text 
searching and access to print-disabled patrons.58 The Second Circuit agreed that this factor 
weighed in favor of HathiTrust, because the copying, though entire, were not excessive or 
unreasonable when balanced against the purposes identified by HathiTrust.59 The court rejected 
Authors Guild’s argument that HDL need not retain both a text and digital image file copy of the 
works, because the text files are required for the full-text searching and text-to-speech 
capabilities, while the image files are even more necessary as the main means of access for 
disabled patrons.60 
4. Effect on the Market for or Value of the Works 
Finally, the fourth factor requires the court to “assess the impact of the use on the 
traditional market for the copyrighted work.”61 As “the single most important element of fair 
use,”62 “the copyright holder must point to market harm that results because the secondary use 
                                                 
56 Id. at 96. 
57 Authors Guild, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 462. 
58 Id. 
59 Authors Guild, 755 F.3d at 98-99. 
60 Id. at 102-03. 
61 Id. at 96. 
62 Id. 
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serves as a substitute for the original work.”63 Further, when a use is found to be noncommercial, 
like it was for HDL, the plaintiff is required to show that “some meaningful likelihood of future 
harm exists.”64 
The district court rejected Authors Guild’s first argument that each copy on HDL 
represents a “lost sale” that would have occurred had the defendants purchased another copy. 
Instead, the district court reasoned that such a purchase could not have enabled the 
transformative uses of full-text searching and print-disabled access.65 Authors Guild’s second 
argument fared no better. The plaintiff’s argument that the availability of the digital copies on 
HDL exposes their author’s works to “widespread internet piracy” which could greatly disrupt 
the book’s market, was also rejected for failing to demonstrate the likelihood of any future harm 
in the face of HathiTrust’s showing of security measures in place.66 Third, and lastly, Authors 
Guild argued that HDL will undermine existing and potential licensing opportunities, though 
concede they have no evidentiary proof of this future harm.67 Indeed, HathiTrust countered that 
the cost of developing a licensing market for the purposes for which HDL uses the works, full-
text searching and print-disabled access, would be entirely cost-prohibitive.68 
The Second Circuit, similarly concluded that the fourth factor weighs in favor of 
HathiTrust, and drew important weight on the distinction of the main type of economic harm that 
is considered by the courts – the harm to a traditional market that is caused because the 
secondary use is a substitute for the original. Drawing an analogy to book reviews, the Second 
                                                                                                                                                             
62 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). 
63 Authors Guild, 755 F.3d at 96. 
64 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984). 
65 Authors Guild v. Hathitrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
66 Id. at 462-63. 
67 Id. at 463. 
68 Id. 
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Circuit stated, that “[t]he only market harms that count are the ones that are caused because the 
secondary use serves as a substitute for the original, not when the secondary use is 
transformative.”69 Like an author upset about a negative review who has no claim for harm, 
neither does Authors Guild have a complaint here. In regards to the print-disabled market 
specifically, the Second Circuit notes that the current market for handicap accessible books is so 
insignificant that “it is common practice in the publishing industry for authors to forgo royalties 
that are generated through the sale of books manufactured in specialized formats for the 
blind . . . .”70 
D. Conclusion & Impact 
 
Ultimately, the district court and the Second Circuit reasoned that in weighing the fair use 
factors, the goals of copyright are best served by allowing the digitization of print materials 
rather than prohibiting it.71 The fact that the full-text searching does not divulge any in-copyright 
material, taken with the important social benefit to the public of providing print-disabled access, 
confirmed the court’s belief that the basic foundation of copyright law was furthered by the 
HDL. 
The gap in time between the HathiTrust decision and the Bridgeman decision clearly 
affected the outcome of HathiTrust. A reliance by the general public and scholars alike on the 
availability of digitized works on the Internet exists in a way that it had not before. Had 
HathiTrust been decided at the same time as Bridgeman, it likely would have suffered the same 
fate. The emphasis now on transformative use allows courts to properly balance social cost with 
the cost for the copyright owner against a modern technological background.  
                                                 
69 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir. 2014). 
70 Id. at 103. 
71 Authors Guild, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 464. 
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III. Bridgeman Revisited 
 
A. The Fair Use Factors 
 
An application of the fair use factors to the facts of Bridgeman and similar organizations 
and institutions, specifically art museums and their policies for digitizing their collections that 
create repositories of digital photographic reproductions of artworks would reach the conclusion 
that such a use would likely be considered fair. Despite exact and wholesale copying of artwork 
by Bridgeman’s transformative purpose as an educational and cultural reference repository, as 
well as its minor effect on either the direct or secondary market, considered as a whole, would 
weigh in favor of Bridgeman. 
1. Character and Purpose of the Use 
Section 107 lists several noncommercial purposes that courts have traditionally regarded 
as fair use, including criticism and parody, scholarship, research, news reporting, and teaching.72 
The commercial/non-commercial distinction that drives this factor “is not whether the sole 
motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the 
copyrighted material without paying the customary price.”73 In other words, even though an 
entity may profit from their enterprise, the use is not necessarily commercial.  
 The use by Bridgeman and its counterparts does not fall easily or obviously within either 
of the two categorical distinctions. This sort of entity, claiming fair use, has never before been 
brought in front of the courts. While it serves purposes for research and education, it also profits 
from the licensing service it provides. Its function as an electronic reference database, weighs 
heavily towards a finding of non-commercialism. However, those looking to use the available 
digital images for even educational purposes will still be required to pay a licensing fee. 
                                                 
72  See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).  
73 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). 
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Arguably, very traditional non-commercial entities like libraries and museums also have 
widespread policies for charging for educational licenses too, despite typically being considered 
non-commercial. However, because Bridgeman operates solely as a third-party licensing body, 
the digital photographs would likely would be considered a commercial use. 
However, the inquiry does not end there. Since Campbell, Perfect 10 Inc. v. Amazon.com, 
Inc.74, Harper & Row, and now most significantly, HathiTrust, courts have placed heavy weight 
on whether or not the character and purpose of the use of the copyrighted works is 
transformative.75 For a new work to be transformative, it must do “something more than 
repackage or republish the original copyrighted work,” rather, adding a new, further purpose or 
character.76 However, a use in itself does not become transformative merely by making an 
important contribution to the purposes of copyright law.77 In fact, the more transformative the 
new work is found to be, less significance will be placed on other factors, even commercialism, 
which might weigh against a finding of fair use. 78 In Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp. the 
Second Circuit posited that despite the profit motivations of the secondary use, their 
transformative purposes and characters were enough to weigh the first factor in favor of fair 
use.79 In Leibovitz, Paramount’s photograph of Leslie Nielsen commissioned for the film Naked 
Gun 33 1/3: The Final Insult so closely resembled a photograph of Demi Moore by Leibovitz. 
                                                 
74 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d. 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
75 See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 549, 604 (2008) (for an empirical study of the “transformativeness doctrine” in fair use case law). 
76 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 96 (2d Cir. 2014). 
77 Id. 
78 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
79 Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d. 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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Even though the use was commercial, it was determined to be transformative because of its 
parodic commentary on the original.80 
The character and purpose of digitally photographing visual works for licensing, 
electronic reference, and cultural education is arguably a very transformative use. The physical 
experience of visiting a museum in person, is one that cannot easily be reproduced, and thus, has 
a different character and purpose from their digital counterparts. 
Like in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., the commercial use should not weigh against fair use 
because the copies were incidental rather than exploitative and were used for a different purpose 
than the original.81 In Arriba Soft, Leslie Kelly, who was a professional photographer, 
maintained a website with thumbnail images of some of his works.82 Arriba Soft operated a 
search engine that displays thumbnail images instead of text and often populates its database by 
copying images from other website.83 Certainly, it was the intended purpose of the photographers 
and their institutions that the photographs be exact likenesses of the original artwork, but it was 
not done with knowing bad faith. Whereas in Harper & Row, a journalist for The Nation 
magazine could not depend on a fair use defense when he published verbatim quotes from 
President Ford’s memoirs which had not yet been published.84 Rather, the use here is merely one 
that is already a well-established practice by museums and libraries alike. The Ninth Circuit in 
Perfect 10 reasoned that a search engine’s use of thumbnail images “provides social benefit by 
incorporating an original work into a new work, namely, an electronic reference tool.”85 Here, 
                                                 
80 Id. 
81 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818–19 (9th Cir. 2003). 
82 Id. at 815. 
83 Id. 
84 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). 
85 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d. 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Beebe, supra note 
75, at 604. 
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the use of images in the way that Bridgeman does, is very similar to the providing of an 
electronic reference tool. The use of course, is most similar to the transformative use found in 
HathiTrust, focusing heavily on HDL’s ability to provide beneficial full-text search. 
Bridgeman’s assemblage of digital images of visual works from all over the world are searchable 
by artist, style, period, museum or institution, and medium, to name only a few.  
Ultimately, the digital images serve a different function from that of the tangible, visual 
artworks that hang in museums and galleries all over the world. They provide an opportunity for 
dissemination of the works to promote cultural and educational aims which might otherwise not 
be available, except in a physical visit to view the visual work. 
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Works 
 The second factor recognizes that there is a hierarchy of copyright protection in which 
original, creative works are afforded greater protection than derivative works or factual 
compilations.86 In Campbell and in HathiTrust, the nature of the original copyrighted work was 
an artistic creation that very much falls close to the “core of intended copyright protection.”87 
The visual artwork from which Bridgeman’s digital photographs are taken, are quintessential 
examples of core protected works. However, this factor is hardly ever found to be determinative 
in the evaluation of all the factors and is usually given very little weight.88 Therefore, even a 
finding on this factor against a defendant does not end the analysis. 
  
                                                 
86 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994). 
87  Id. 
88 On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 175 (2d Cir. 2001). 
17 of 21 
 
3. Amount and Substantiality of the Work Copied  
The third factor inquires whether more copying than necessary was used and whether or 
not that copying was excessive.89 Because a conclusion on whether copying is excessive depends 
on the purpose and character of the use,90 sometimes it is necessary to copy entire works, and the 
factor does not weigh against a finding of fair use.91 For example, in Bill Graham Archives v. 
Dorling Kindersley Ltd.,92 Arriba Soft,93 and Perfect 10,94 entire images were copied but were 
deemed necessary for recognition and to further the ultimate purpose of the secondary use. 
Because even “wholesale copying” can be protected where the “use and purpose for the copies 
was clearly distinguishable from those of the original,” a finding of a transformative use may 
make Bridgeman’s intentionally identical digital photographs of visual artwork necessary.95 
4. Effect on the Market for or Value of the Works 
A finding of commerciality is not necessarily dispositive of a finding against fair use. 
“The strength of the Sony presumption may vary according to the context in which it arises, and 
the presumption disappears entirely where the challenged use is one that transforms the original 
work into a new artistic creation.”96 In other words, the Sony presumption effectively lost its bite 
when the Supreme Court stated in Campbell that “Sony stands for the proposition that the ‘fact 
                                                 
89 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2014). 
90 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-87. 
91 Authors Guild, 755 F.3d at 98. 
92 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the 
defendant’s use of Bill Graham Archives’ images “is tailored to further its transformative purpose 
because DK's reduced size reproductions of BGA's images in their entirety displayed the minimal image 
size and quality necessary to ensure the reader's recognition of the images.”). 
93 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821-22 (9th Cir. 2003) (“It was necessary for Arriba to copy 
the entire image to allow users to recognize the image and decide whether to pursue more information 
about the image or the originating web site. If Arriba only copied part of the image, it would be more 
difficult to identify it, thereby reducing the usefulness of the visual search engine.”). 
94 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d. 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the same 
analysis applies to Google's use of Perfect 10's image). 
95 Authors Guild v. Hathitrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
96 Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Serv., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1386 (6th Cir. 1996). 
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that a publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to weigh 
against a finding of fair use.’”97  Therefore, if the use is found to be commercial, there is a 
tendency towards unfairness in “mere duplication” that effectively replaces the market for the 
original. However, a use that is non-commercial requires the plaintiff asserting market harm to 
carry the burden of proving either harm on the potential market or to the potential value of the 
original.98 
Any inquiry begins with determining what exactly is the market or markets at issue. 
First, the new work’s effect on the market or value of the original work is evaluated. The digital 
photographs of the artwork are not being proffered as fine art like the originals. They are not sold 
in galleries with the hopes of being mistaken as the original itself, nor are they being sold as new 
editions of previously published works. The market for the original market, therefore, is 
untouched. Neither is the value of the original visual art likely to be affected by its digitization. 
In fact, quite the opposite seems possible. As the visual artwork becomes more notable in the 
public mind, so too does the value of the artwork itself. Therefore, the primary market and the 
value of the original is unaffected by making digital photographic copies of the visual work.  
The secondary, or derivative market is arguably affected – licensing is essentially 
monopolized by one organization, but this is a hazard these organizations have chosen to bear. 
Museums and libraries have already taken this into account, just as the participating libraries in 
HathiTrust did, in their original agreement with Google. Many have chosen to forego individual 
licenses (which in many cases they still reserve the right to grant) in favor of this larger one to 
Bridgeman-like organizations. Even for the museums and libraries that license individually 
                                                 
97 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 (1994) (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)). 
98 Id. at 591; see also, Princeton, 99 F.3d at 1386. 
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without third-party assistance, a holding contrary to one in favor of fair use on that factor would 
affect their potential market just as considerably. 
 Just as transformativeness plays a significant role in the evaluation of the other factors, so 
too does it play a role in the analysis of the fourth factor. The Second Circuit, in HathiTrust held 
that a copyright holder cannot detrimentally effect a transformative market. 99 “Were a court 
automatically to conclude in every case that potential licensing revenues were impermissibly 
impaired simply because the secondary user did not pay a fee for the right to engage in the use, 
the fourth factor would always favor the copyright owner.”100 Therefore, even if the museums 
and libraries digitally photographing the digital works do not seek a licensing agreement from 
the artist (though in many cases they do), a loss to a potential licensing market is not enough, 
because theoretically every fair use case begins because of failures to license. 
IV. Conclusion 
 It seems that for many, the Bridgeman holding is in practice, superfluous.101 Museums 
and other similar organizations, even monoliths like the Art Institute of Chicago and the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, continue to license and assert copyright in their photographic 
reproductions despite a shaky or nonexistent legal basis for their claims of copyright 
ownership.102 Such museums have been able to rely on the social pressure and past practices that 
exist within the museum world regarding each organization’s intellectual property. Some even 
argue that because Bridgeman has never been affirmed on the appellate level, its holdings apply 
                                                 
99 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 103 (2d Cir. 2014). 
100 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929 (2d Cir. 1994). 
101 Mary Campbell Wojcik, The Antithesis of Originality: Bridgeman, Image Licensors, and the Public 
Domain, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 257, 270-72 (2008). 
102 Id. 
20 of 21 
 
only to the Southern District of New York.103 This may well be the case, but here is what we do 
know:  
Any museum that argues the inapplicability of Judge Kaplan's rulings should trade its 
myopic focus on Bridgeman for a clear view of the larger copyright landscape. Because 
in this landscape one holds no copyright in faithful copies of works that have passed into 
the public domain, in it, Bridgeman is only a single instance among many.104 
 
Obviously, this is problematic. However, this illustrates the system that has been in place before 
(and after) Bridgeman, has become seriously ingrained, for better or worse, and there is a heavy 
dependency on its continued existence. 
 A conclusion that the fair use doctrine applies and allows digital photographic 
reproductions to be made of works of art, even if effective, still cannot overcome the originality 
issue that was central to the Bridgeman holding as it applies to works in the public domain. From 
a policy perspective, allowing photographic reproductions of visual artwork as protected through 
fair use is preferable to the contractual licensing obligations museums would otherwise have to 
secure, which would certainly be more limiting. As a result, revenue would be taken from 
museums, the creation of high-quality reproductions would be discouraged, and most 
importantly, the public would be restricted in its global access to artwork generally. However, as 
it applies to works still under copyright, under the current rule, museums have very little 
incentive to continue to make high-quality reproductions of their artwork. It is unlikely that 
anyone outside of the museum would be inclined to produce reproductions of artworks in a 
museum’s collection, especially so if the work is under the public domain. 
It is undoubtable that had Bridgeman been decided today, the outcome would have been 
different. The same can be said for HathiTrust, had it been decided in 1999. Copyright law has 
                                                 
103 Colin T. Cameron, In Defiance of Bridgeman: Claiming Copyright in Photographic 
Reproductions of Public Domain Works, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 31, 47 (2006).  
104 Wojcik, supra note 101, at 272. 
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changed – largely due to the advances and reliance on digital technologies – and should, as a 
result, be followed with a change in the law. 
